The relationship between dynamic capabilities, the firm’s resource base and performance in a post-disaster environment by Battisti, Martina & Deakins, David
1 
 
The relationship between dynamic capabilities, the firm’s resource base and 
performance in a post-disaster environment  
 
Martina Battisti, Massey University, New Zealand 
David Deakins, Lancaster University, United Kingdom 
 
Abstract 
This article draws on quantitative survey evidence to explore the role of dynamic capabilities 
in a post-disaster environment, that of Christchurch in New Zealand after the 2010 and 2011 
series of major earthquakes. We develop a model to examine the relationship between 
dynamic capabilities, disaster-related changes to the firm’s resource base and its 
performance. The hypotheses are tested using a sample of 545 small firms that have been 
affected by the earthquakes. Results highlight the importance of a firm’s proactive posture 
and capability to integrate resources in recognising new opportunities in an environment 
characterised by high volatility and increased uncertainty. These findings offer important 
theoretical and practical implications. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
On 4 September 2010, the city of Christchurch in New Zealand was shaken by a MM1 
7.1 earthquake which was followed by a more devastating MM 6.3 earthquake on 22 February 
2011. Although the September 2010 earthquake did not produce widespread damage, it 
                                                          
1 The Modified Mercalli scale is a seismic scale used for measuring the intensity of an earthquake. 
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resulted in increased vulnerability for buildings in the city centre to further earthquakes and 
many were either damaged or collapsed causing major loss of life from the February 2011 
event. The city continued to suffer aftershocks with further major earthquakes in December 
2011 and June 2012. The city’s infrastructure was badly damaged by the series of 
earthquakes resulting in more than 1,000 commercial buildings being demolished and more 
than 7,000 residential buildings being red-zoned meaning that they were on land that was 
considered too uncertain, costly and disruptive to repair. The damage to the local economy is 
estimated to be about 19 percent of New Zealand’s GDP with the costs of rebuilding estimated 
to reach NZ$40billion (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2012). In terms of 
insurance losses the Christchurch earthquakes are considered to be the third most expensive 
disaster in history (Swiss Re, 2012). With a population of 376,700 in June 2010, Christchurch 
was New Zealand’s second largest city, but the combined effects of the series of earthquakes 
and aftershocks led to a fall of 9 per cent in the City’s population to 341,469 by March 2013 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2013). 
It is arguable that in terms of impact, the Christchurch earthquakes were more 
damaging and lasting on the New Zealand economy than other better known disasters in 
other developed nations such as, for example, the well documented effects of hurricane 
Katrina on the city of New Orleans and the US economy. This is because the major disruption 
in Christchurch had a proportionately greater effect since New Zealand is a small, open 
economy with a population of 4.4 million (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). The Inland Revenue 
Department reported that two thirds of business owners in Christchurch have been adversely 
affected by the earthquakes (Inland Revenue, 2012). By July 2013, net business migration 
was still negative indicating that more businesses are leaving the earthquake affected region 
than arriving into the region (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2013). Despite 
significant damage to commercial and residential property as well as public infrastructure 
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resulting in high numbers of relocation as well as changes in demand, some small firms have 
proven to be able to recover quickly from the disaster. 
This article draws on quantitative survey evidence of small firms that have survived a 
natural disaster to explore why some firms perform better than others despite having been 
affected by the same disaster. Building on the dynamic capability view as well as the disaster 
management literature we develop and test a research model of the relationships between 
dynamic capabilities, a disaster’s impact on the firm’s resource base and its performance.  
The dynamic capabilities view is relevant for the study of small firm behaviour in post-disaster 
environments for two reasons. First, natural disasters affect the business environment in a 
number of ways such as for example through damage to infrastructure, changes in the labour 
market, changes in customer demand as well as changes to supply availability and costs. 
These changes create a highly volatile and uncertain environment for businesses that can be 
seen as characteristic of Schumpeter’s creative destruction i.e. the process through which 
economic value is created by destroying and replacing established economic structures with 
new ones (Schumpeter, 1994). The extent to which entrepreneurs respond to these new 
opportunities will depend on their ability to adapt the firm’s resource (Teece, 2012). Sullivan-
Taylor and Branicki (2011) argue that focusing on the capabilities of small firm will contribute 
to a better understanding of their recovery.  
Second, the dynamic capabilities view emphasises the important role of managers in 
the deployment of resources and how their perception of environmental volatility impacts on 
the deployment of those resources. It has been argued that dynamic capabilities lie within the 
firm’s core management (Helfat and Martin, 2015; Helfat and Peteraf, 2015; Teece, 2007) 
and it is the managerial judgement that influences the deployment of dynamic capabilities 
(Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009). Similar firms can therefore deploy different dynamic 
capabilities as a result of differences in their managers’ perception of environmental 
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uncertainties (Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003). In the context of small firms, this highlights 
the importance of entrepreneurial behaviour in the recognition and exploitation of 
opportunities in a Schumpeterian environment that is characteristic of post-disaster 
economies. 
This study contributes to the literature on disaster management as well as dynamic 
capabilities in four ways: First, much of previous disaster research has been on people and/or 
family units, government agencies and on households as a unit of analysis (Zhang, Lindell 
and Prater, 2009). By contrast, research evidence on businesses has been limited (Liu, Xu 
and Han, 2013). Particularly, work that focuses on disaster recovery and resilience of small 
firms has been rare (Herbane, 2010; Herbane 2013). This study provides much needed 
evidence on the role of small businesses in the recovery of local economies.  
Second, previous research is predominantly based on qualitative case-studies due to 
the challenges associated with studying businesses in a post-disaster environment. Further, 
previous research has predominantly focused on the effects on businesses within the impact 
zone (Deitch and Corey, 2011; Webb, Tierney and Dahlhamer, 2000). This article draws on 
quantitative survey evidence of 545 micro, small and medium-sized firms inside and outside 
the impact zone. This approach allowed for a detailed and in-depth exploration of the varied 
effects the earthquakes had on businesses depending on size, sector, locality and age.  
Third, this article applies the dynamic capabilities view to a novel context: i.e. small 
firms in a post-disaster environment. Nelson and Winter (2002) have demonstrated that firms 
establish routines and structures through planning that are then taken for granted. They can, 
however, leave firms unprepared in the event of a disaster. Disasters create highly volatile 
environments that pose challenges to a firm’s planning process. For planning to be effective, 
environments need to be relatively stable and predictable to allow for reliable analysis and 
forecasting that are at the heart of strategic planning (McGrath, 2013). Post-disaster 
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environments, however, can be compared to transient advantage economies (McGrath, 
2013), where opportunities are temporary and changing. Dynamic capabilities represent the 
ability of firms to quickly learn and adapt to the new circumstances and therefor provides an 
ideal theoretical lens that has – to our knowledge – not yet been explored post-disaster 
environments. 
Fourth, using a multidimensional construct this study makes a theoretical contribution 
to the dynamic capabilities view by further clarifying the conceptual distinction between 
regenerating and renewing dynamic capabilities building on Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier’s 
work (2009). We specifically focus on the role of resource integration as a renewing dynamic 
capability which has received comparably little attention to date. By introducing two adapted 
measurement scales from the organisational resilience literature (Lee, Vargo and Seville, 
2013; Stephenson, Vargo and Seville, 2010) we measure dynamic capabilities in a novel 
context. 
In a recent review, Koryak et al. (2015) noted that few studies have explicitly focused 
on dynamic capabilities in small firms. By integrating concepts from the disaster management 
literature, this article contributes to our understanding of the role of dynamic capabilities in 
small firms in a unique context.  
The article is organised with the following sections:  literature review and hypotheses 
development, research model, research methods, survey evidence and discussion and 
conclusions. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Disaster impact on small firms’ resource base 
Previous studies have predominantly focused on post environments of economic 
disasters such as that of the Global Financial Crisis which has indicated varying effects on 
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small firms (e.g. Bamiatzi and Kirchmaier, 2014; Cowling et al., 2015; Smallbone et al., 2012; 
Williams and Vorley, 2014). To date, there is only a small number of studies that explore how 
natural disasters impact on small firms (Chang and Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Dahles and 
Susilowati, 2015; Deitch and Corey, 2011; Kroll et al., 1990; Neef Panyakotkaew and Elstner, 
2015; Parker et al., 2009; Tierney, 1997; Webb, Tierney and Dahlhamer, 2000).  
Natural disasters can impact on different types of resource. In the case of an 
earthquake, the firm’s physical resources such as for example its premises might be damaged 
resulting in temporary closure or a need for relocation. Further, staffing levels and availability 
might be affected by physical or mental health issues caused by the disaster as well as 
dislocation or migration effects. Similarly, disasters can affect customer levels as well as 
supply availability. These examples illustrate that a disaster can affect a business directly i.e. 
through immediate damage, but also – and more importantly – indirectly through for example 
changes in the market and the extent to which the firm’s customers were adversely affected 
by the disaster. It is likely that natural disasters such as an earthquake impact unevenly on 
the resource base of small firms. Depending on the size or age of the firm, sector and locality 
some might be affected worse than others, some might experience positive effects while 
others experience negative effects or no effects at all.  
Dolfman, Wasser and Bergman (2007) demonstrate the diverse effects of Katrina on 
the New Orleans economy on the resource base of firms in different sectors. Using labour 
market data the authors show that retail trade, accommodation and food services, health care 
and social assistance were the three worst affected sectors in terms of job losses. Because 
of the disproportionate loss of jobs in these three sectors, the average wage for the remaining 
jobs rose by almost 30 percent. Even four years later, the retail and service sectors were still 
performing worse than the manufacturing and construction sector due to ongoing problems 
related to loss of customers, acquiring labour, supply and capital restrictions (Deitch and 
Corey, 2011). This pattern has also been confirmed in earlier studies such as the 2001 
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Nisqually earthquake where retail businesses experienced a significantly higher financial loss 
compared to other sectors (Chang and Falit-Baiamonte, 2002) and the 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake where retail and service sector businesses were also the most vulnerable (Kroll 
et al., 1990).  
In the case of Christchurch, it had a population of 376,700 in June 2010, and was New 
Zealand’s second largest city, but the combined effects of the series of earthquakes and 
aftershocks during September 2010 to June 2011 led to a considerable fall in the City’s 
population caused by a net outflow of residents. The working age population shrunk by around 
28,000 and this number is likely to underestimate the full migration effects due to difficulties 
collecting this data in a post-disaster environment (Parker and Steenkamp, 2012).  
As a result, customer numbers were dropping and the level of retail spending in the 
region was well below the national average (Potter et al., 2015). Further, the impact of the 
Christchurch earthquakes was overly concentrated on the central business district, where the 
majority of firms were service providers in retail, hospitality, tourism and education. As a result, 
the following hypothesis has been developed: 
Hypothesis 1a: For services firms, it is significantly more likely that a disaster has a negative 
impact on their resource base compared to manufacturing firms. 
In relation to locality, previous research has predominantly focused on the effects of a 
disaster on businesses within the impact zone (Deitch and Corey, 2011; Webb, Tierney and 
Dahlhamer, 2000) and there is a lack of evidence on how firms outside the impact zone are 
affected. It is for example more likely that the physical resources (e.g. premises) of firms inside 
the impact zone are more negatively affected as a result of the immediate effects of a disaster. 
In contrast, firms outside the impact zone might be more likely to be negatively affected as a 
result of changes to customer demand or supply availability (Zhang, Lindell and Prater, 2009). 
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This suggests that a disaster can affect a firm’s resource base even if it is not located within 
the impact zone. 
Hypothesis 1b: A disaster can impact on a firm’s resource base independent of their location 
within the impact zone or outside the impact zone. 
It has been argued that small firms have more limited internal resources compared to 
larger firms and therefore fewer resources to prepare for disruptive events (Smallbone et al., 
2012). Webb, Tierney and Dahlhamer (2000) concluded in their review of research on the 
effect of disasters on businesses, that larger firms have a higher propensity to prepare for 
disasters as they have more resources available in terms of dedicated staff as well as 
finances. Further, small firms often rely on local and/or niche markets being highly dependent 
on a limited number of key customers as well as suppliers who are often small firms 
themselves (Smallbone et al., 2012; Storey, 1994). As those relationships are often strong 
and long-established, they can be difficult to replace when lost as a result of a disaster. Small 
firms also often operate out of a single location and have fewer options to quickly relocate if 
necessary (Kroll et al., 1990). While a disaster might cause a similar loss of resources for 
small and large firms alike such as for example that both have their physical premises 
destroyed, this resource loss might have a more negative impact on small, niche-focused 
firms due to lack of preparedness and/or difficulty replacing resources. As a result, the 
following hypothesis has been developed: 
Hypothesis 1c: For smaller firms it is significantly more likely that a disaster has a negative 
impact on their resource base compared to larger firms. 
Related to the above is the discussion of the relationship between firm age and 
resources. The limited empirical evidence that exists to date is on the relationship between 
firm age and recovery and it is inconclusive. While older firms were less likely to recover after 
Hurricane Andrew, age was not a significant predictor of recovery after the Loma Prieta 
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earthquake (Webb, Tierney and Dahlhamer 2002) or hurricane Katarina (Fraccastoro 2008). 
To our knowledge no empirical evidence exists on the relationship between firm age and the 
effects disasters have on the resource base of small firms. In light of the absence of previous 
research in this area, we draw on the liability of aging assumption to hypothesise this 
relationship. It states that as firms age, they establish structures, rules and routines that might 
lead to efficiency gains in stable environments. In highly volatile environments, however, 
these structures, rules and routines impede a firm’s ability to act in a timely manner due to 
inertial forces (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Barron, 1994; Ranger-Moore, 1997; Thornhill and 
Amit, 2003). The rapidity and flexibility in decision-making, however, has been emphasised 
as a key factor that determines how firms respond to disaster situations (Sullivan-Taylor and 
Branicki, 2011; Vargo and Seville, 2011). As a result, it could be argued that while older firms 
might have accumulated a larger and potentially more valuable resource stock, these 
resources might no longer be relevant in a disaster situation. Inertial forces might limit the 
firm’s ability to adapt and they therefor experience the impact a disaster has on their resource 
base as more negatively than younger firms.  
Hypothesis 1d: For older firms, it is significantly more likely that a disaster has a negative 
impact on their resource base compared to younger firms. 
 
2.2 Relationship between dynamic capabilities, disaster-related changes to a firm’s 
resource base and its performance 
The concept of dynamic capabilities has evolved from the resource-based view (RBV) 
of the firm. The RBV argues that resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and 
imperfectly substitutable (VRIN) are a source of competitive advantage, but it does not explain 
how these resources evolve over time and how they can be adapted to quickly changing 
environments (Barney, 1986; 1991). As a result, the RBV is only able to explain the 
importance of resources to the competitive advantage and performance of firms in stable 
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environments. The dynamic capability view addresses some of these shortcomings by 
focusing on a firm’s capacity to renew and reconfigure its resource base in the light of 
changing environments (Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier, 2009; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Helfat et al. (2007, p.1) define dynamic capabilities as a 
firm’s capacity to ‘purposefully create, extend and modify its resource base’.  
This indicates that capabilities are built rather than bought in the market, embedded in 
the firm, repeatable and of strategic importance (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). More specifically, 
capabilities are understood as organisational and managerial processes i.e. the firm’s 
‘routines or patterns of current practice and learning’ (Teece and Pisano, 1994, p.541) that 
enable it to change its resource base. Dynamic therefore refers to intentional change of the 
firm’s resource base rather than the change in the environment (Ambrosini and Bowman, 
2009).  
Previous literature distinguishes predominantly two or three types of capabilities. The 
first type of capabilities describes the resource base itself i.e. the VRIN resources that are the 
foundation of a firm’s ability to perform basic functional activities. This type has been labelled 
as first category capabilities (Collis, 1994), zero-level capabilities (Winter, 2003) or 
substantive capabilities (Zahra, Sapienza and Davidson, 2006). The second type are 
capabilities that allow for a more dynamic improvement through creating, modifying and 
extending the resource base. This type of capabilities has been labelled second and third 
categories (Collis, 1994), first-order capabilities (Winter, 2003) or dynamic capabilities (Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Zahra, Sapienza and Davidson, 2006). The third type of capabilities 
is referred to as meta-capabilities (Collis, 1994) or higher-order capabilities (Winter, 2003) 
and is characterised by learning-to-learn capabilities.  
Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier (2009) propose a hierarchical model of dynamic 
capabilities. While the firm’s resources are considered to be the foundation of the model they 
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are not a dynamic capability per se as in other typologies described above. According to 
Ambrosini Bowman and Collier (2009) dynamic capabilities consist of incremental, renewing 
and regenerative dynamic capabilities. Incremental dynamic capabilities are used to adjust 
and incrementally improve the resource base without changing the nature of the resources. 
While applying incremental dynamic capabilities might be sufficient in stable environments 
they are unlikely to sustain rent generation in dynamic environments. In this case, renewing 
dynamic capabilities allow creating new resources and therefore change the nature of the 
resource base of the firm. Regenerative dynamic capabilities are employed to change the 
firm’s current set of incremental and renewing dynamic capabilities rather than its resource 
base. They become relevant in highly volatile environments where the existing capabilities to 
change the firm’s resource base are no longer appropriate or sufficient to sustain rent 
generation. Regenerative dynamic capabilities are therefore about learning. Ambrosini, 
Bowman and Collier (2009) argue that different types of dynamic capabilities are needed 
depending on how stable or dynamic the environment is perceived. The model also highlights 
the need to renew the capabilities rather than just the resource base.  
The following processes have been described as core dimensions of dynamic 
capabilities: reconfiguration, leveraging, learning, sensing and seizing, knowledge creation as 
well as knowledge integration (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009; Ambrosini, Bowman and 
Collier, 2009; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; McKelvie and Davidson, 2009; Teece, 2007, 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Zahra and George, 2002; Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
According to Makkonen et al. (2014) reconfiguration, leveraging and learning represent 
regenerative dynamic capabilities while sensing and seizing, knowledge creation and 
knowledge integration represent renewing dynamic capabilities.  
For the purpose of this article, two concepts from the organisational resilience literature 
are introduced to represent dynamic capabilities in a post-disaster environment: proactive 
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posture (Lee, Vargo and Seville, 2013; Stephenson, Vargo and Seville, 2010; Sullivan-Taylor 
and Branicki, 2011) and capability to integrate external resources (McManus et al., 2008).  
2.2.1 Proactive posture as a regenerative dynamic capability 
It has been argued that the strategic posture of an organisation determines its ability 
to respond to change and its level of innovativeness. Through its strategic posture, a firm 
interprets and responds to its environment by adapting its strategy to the changing 
requirements (Mintzberg, 1978; Porter, 1985). Sullivan-Taylor and Branicki (2011) argue that 
despite the flexibility and nimbleness of small firms, they do not have the necessary resource 
base associated with resilience suggesting that small firms need to be more proactive in their 
approach to disaster management. Proactive posture is defined as a firm’s ”strategic and 
behavioral readiness to respond to early warning signals of change in the organization’s 
internal and external environment before they escalate into crisis” (Lee, Vargo and Seville, 
2013, p34). A proactive posture allows for individual and collective learning (Larson and 
Fowler, 2009; Stern, 1997) that enables firms to be more innovative (Oezsomer, Catalone 
and Bonetto, 1997) and it was found to be a key determinant of recovery after a disaster (Lee, 
Vargo and Seville, 2013). In this study we argue that proactive posture corresponds with the 
learning dimension of dynamic capabilities (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003; Zollo and Winter, 
2002) which Makkonen et al. (2014) classify as a regenerative dynamic capability. As a 
regenerative dynamic capability, proactive posture does not directly impact on a firm’s 
resource base, but changes ‘how’ firms operate e.g. through collaborating with external 
partners to acquire and develop new capabilities that allow them to position themselves 
favourably in a highly volatile environment. As a result, the following two hypotheses have 
been developed. 
Hypothesis 2a - A firm’s proactive posture positively affects its capability to acquire and 
integrate resources from external sources. 
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Hypothesis 2b – A firm’s proactive posture mediates the relationship between its capability 
to acquire and integrate resources from external sources and the extent to which a disaster 
impacts on its resource base.  
2.2.2 Resource integration as a renewing dynamic capability 
In a disaster some firms might not be able to recover their resources or they find that 
the resources are no longer relevant in a significantly altered post-disaster environment. As a 
result, they might become reliant on external networks to help them access new resources to 
be able to effectively respond to and recover from the disaster (McManus et al., 2008; Lee, 
Vargo and Seville, 2013). In an extension of the RBV approach, social capital is seen as a 
relational concept in which the extent of an entrepreneur’s embeddedness in networks is a 
key factor in determining the acquisition of resources (Nahapiet and Ghosal, 1998). In this 
approach the entrepreneur is able to use networks to access a ‘reservoir’ of resources 
(Anderson and Jack, 2002, p.195).  To what extent a disaster impacts on a firm’s resource 
base might therefore depend on how well it is able to explore new opportunities by creating 
and mobilise this ‘reservoir’ of resources as part of an interdependent network. Hence, the 
current study considers a firm’s capability to acquire and integrate new resources from 
external sources a salient part of the knowledge integration dimension of dynamic capabilities 
(Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier, 2009; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
Knowledge integration has been defined as the “capability to acquire and integrate new 
knowledge through external sources such as networks, also referring to the utilisation of social 
capital” and represents a renewing dynamic capability (Makkonon et al., 2014, p.2709). As a 
renewing dynamic capability it directly affects the firm’s resource base i.e. the ‘what’ the firm 
experiences in relation to changes to customers, staff, supply or premises as a result of a 
disaster.  
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Hypothesis 3 - A firm’s capability to integrate resources from external sources positively 
affects the extent to which a disaster impacts on its resource base. 
2.2.3 Relationship between disaster-related changes to a firm’s resource base and its 
performance 
Previous research evidence on how disasters affect firm performance shows a rather 
inconsistent picture. Anecdotal evidence suggests that disasters result in a decline of 
performance as evidenced by significant numbers of closure and failure for businesses, 
usually shortly after the event. Tierney (2007) argues that performance changes as a result 
of a disaster can take many forms. A disaster does not necessarily need to lead to formal 
bankruptcy as a result of declining performance, but can also lead to what has been called 
“dead business walking” i.e. when the business operates at a significantly lower level than 
before the disaster, records a loss and has little prospect of continued viability. This points to 
the long-term and cumulative effects of a disaster on a firm’s performance that are quite 
distinctive from the immediate and short-term effects of a disaster. Webb, Tierney and 
Dahlhamer (2000), however, found that most businesses, even those that were hard-hit, 
recover from a disaster. The performance of the vast majority of firms returned to pre-disaster 
levels, with a substantial number of businesses even reporting increased performance. 
Deitch and Corey’s (2011) study on businesses in New Orleans post-Katrina found 75 percent 
of surviving businesses were doing as well or even better than pre-Katrina, with some doing 
outstandingly better. They conclude that to persevere under adverse conditions, a business 
needs enough resources. This can be interpreted that small business can make up some of 
the disadvantages of resource scarcity by rapidity of response and flexibility. If they manage 
to adapt quickly, they can seize the opportunity – if not, they are likely to run out of resources 
that are necessary for a recovery. This finding is in line with Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier’s 
(2009) argument that it is the firm’s resource base that is directly linked to its performance 
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rather than its dynamic capabilities. Changes to the firm’s resource base due to a disaster 
are therefore likely to cause changes in performance.  
H4 – The extent to which a disaster positively impacts on a firm’s resource base affects its 
performance i.e. the more negative the disaster’s impact on a firm’s resource base, the 
more likely it is that the firm reported decreased performance. 
2.3 Research model 
The research model presented in Figure 1 depicts the formulated hypotheses. The 
model represents the relationship between regenerative (i.e. proactive posture) and renewing 
dynamic capabilities (i.e. resource integration), disaster-related changes to the firm’s resource 
base and its performance in a post-disaster environment. It illustrates conceptually why some 
firms perform better than others despite them being affected by the same natural disaster. 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
3 METHODOLOGY 
This study uses survey data from a 2011 nation-wide survey of SMEs in New Zealand. 
The study follows SME definitions that have been recommended for New Zealand (Cameron 
and Massey 1999): micro firms with up to five full-time equivalent staff numbers (FTE); small 
firms with six to 49 FTEs; and medium-sized firms with 50 to 99 FTEs. As of 2011, there were 
468,283 SMEs in New Zealand (Ministry of Economic Development, 2011). Of these, 90 
percent were micro-sized, 9 percent were small and one percent was medium-sized. With 
respect to industry, 31 percent represent the manufacturing sector (including construction) 
and 69 percent the services sector (including wholesale and retail, business, finance and 
property and other services).  
The study followed Dillman’s (2007) Total Design Method (TDM) in choosing the 
sample as well as in developing, designing, pilot-testing and administering the postal, self-
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administered questionnaire. The actual survey was carried out over four mailouts between 
October and December 2011. The respondents to the questionnaire were owner-managers 
of the sample firms. Owner-managers specifically refer to individuals who have an ownership 
stake in the firms that they themselves manage in a variety of executive roles (e.g., proprietor, 
general manager, director or CEO). 
The sample drawn is a stratified random sample of SMEs in New Zealand to allow 
comparison of different SME size groups and industry sectors.  
The sample used in this study was derived from the Martins database, a commercial 
provider of business-to-business information in New Zealand. Martins offers the largest and 
most comprehensive business database in New Zealand that is constantly updated and offers 
a range of selection criteria.  
The survey was sent to 3,527 firms and obtained 1,138 usable responses. The 
response rate of 32 percent is well above the minimum acceptable rate for this type of mail 
survey (Bartholomew and Smith 2006). To analyse response bias, Armstrong and Overton’s 
approach (1977) was followed by comparing the answers of those respondents who 
completed the survey early with those who completed the survey late. The insignificant 
differences suggested that non-response bias was non-existent or too small for detection. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
This study utilises a subsample of 545 firms that reported being affected by the 
Christchurch earthquakes, but have survived long enough to be included in the study, to 
explore why some firms perform better than others despite having been affected by the same 
disaster. 
About one fifth of firms are located within the impact zone. Half of the sample are small 
firms with between six and 49 employees. Thirty-six percent of firms are relatively young with 
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ages ranging from 0 to 20 years. Slightly more than half of the firms are engaged in 
manufacturing. 
3.1 Measurement 
Proactive posture (POST) and Resource integration (INTEG) were measured by 
selecting and adapting items from Stephenson, Vargo and Seville (2010) who has developed 
a model and benchmarking tool for organisational resilience. For Proactive posture five items 
were chosen to measure a firm’s strategic and behavioural readiness to adopt, acquire and 
create new capabilities and resources to be able to respond to early warning signals of change 
in its internal and external environment. For Resource integration, five items were chosen to 
measure a firm’s capability to acquire and integrate new resources from external sources in 
the event of a disaster. A five-point Likert scale was used ranging from 1-strongly agree to 5-
strongly disagree. Items for both constructs are listed in Table 2. 
Disaster-related changes to a firm’s resource base (BASE) was measured by five items 
using a five-point Likert scale (1-strong positive impact, to 5-strong negative impact) that have 
been developed as part of this research. The items asked respondents how the Christchurch 
earthquakes have impacted on the firm’s resources in terms of number of customers, staffing 
availability, staffing levels, use of premises and supply availability.  
Firm performance (PERF) was measured by three items using a five-point Likert scale 
(1-strongly increased, to 5-strongly decreased) which asked respondents to indicate the firm’s 
current performance (i.e., at the time of the survey) relative to that of the previous 12 months 
in terms of turnover, profitability, and productivity. These three measures of performance have 
been used repeatedly in previous studies to capture various facets of the multi-dimensional 
nature of firm performance (Darroch, 2005; Wang and Han, 2011).  
Firm size (SIZE) refers to the total number of employees. Firm age (AGE) refers to the 
number of years a firm has been operating since inception. Sector (SEC) refers to whether 
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the firm is engaged in manufacturing (coded 1) or service activities (coded 0). Location (LOC) 
refers to the location of the firm inside the impact zone (coded1) or outside the impact zone 
(coded 0) 
3.2. Data Analysis 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) using a partial least squares (PLS) approach was 
used to test the hypotheses aided by the software called WarpPLS v. 2 (Kock, 2011). The 
PLS approach to SEM is a variance-based path analysis which has the capability to deal with 
complex models.  Following Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step approach to SEM, 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was first performed on all of the constructs in order to 
examine the validity and reliability of the constructs used in the study (Brown, 2006). The 
second step involved the development and testing of the structural model in order to test the 
hypotheses. 
4. FINDINGS  
In this section we present SEM results to advance our understanding of the relations 
between the dynamic capabilities of a firm, the extent to which its resource base was affected 
by the earthquakes and its performance in a post-disaster environment. First, however, we 
present a brief descriptive overview of how the Christchurch earthquakes impacted on the 
resource base of small firms to provide a richer context to the SEM results. 
 
 
4.1 Effect of the Christchurch earthquakes on the resource base of small firms 
Overall, the results have highlighted some interesting differences and similarities in 
how the Christchurch earthquakes have impacted on small businesses in New Zealand. 
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Nationwide, 17 percent of respondents reported a negative effect on the firm’s premises, but 
this number rose to 42 percent for firms within the impact zone. The majority of firms (79 
percent), however, reported that their firm’s premises were unaffected by the earthquakes, 
with only four percent reporting a positive effect.  
Results suggest that the firm’s market - through changes to its customer base – was the worst 
area affected with 44 percent of respondents reporting that the earthquakes had affected them 
negatively. At the same time, however, 23 percent reported a positive effect on their customer 
base indicating that that a disaster can have positive as well as negative effects on firms.  
Further, 37 percent of firms reported that the earthquakes negatively impacted on the 
availability of supplies, four percent reported a positive effect and the remaining 59 percent 
were unaffected.  
Fifteen percent of respondents reported that the earthquakes negatively impacted on 
staff availability, but this number rose to 28 percent for firms within the impact zone. A minority 
of six percent of respondents, however, reported positive effects on staff availability.  
 In relation to staffing levels, 13 percent of respondents reported that the earthquakes 
had negative effects and six percent reported positive effects with the remaining 81 percent 
being unaffected.  
No industry effects were found suggesting that the disaster impacted equally on the 
resource base of services and manufacturing firms. 
4.2 Relationship between a firm’s dynamic capabilities, disaster-related changes to its 
resource base and performance 
To test the hypotheses, SEM was used following Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-
step approach. First, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed on all of the constructs 
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in order to examine the validity and reliability of the constructs used in the study (Brown, 
2006).  
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
Details of the CFA in Table 2 show that all of the items measuring each of the four 
constructs loaded highly on the pre-determined factors (Brown, 2006). 
The measurement model fits the data well, as shown by the significant loadings of 
items in their corresponding constructs at p<.05 with low cross-loadings, which indicates the 
convergent validity of the constructs. The values of Cronbach’s α and composite reliability 
coefficients (CRC) were all above the minimum threshold of .70 (Bagozzi, Yi and Phillips, 
1991; Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
Table 3 shows the correlations of the eight constructs and variables used in the 
succeeding analysis. The bold figures are the square root values of the AVEs of each 
construct. AVE2 values that are higher than the correlation coefficient values of each construct 
relative to other constructs are indicative of discriminant validity (Bagozzi, Yi and Phillips, 
1991; Fornell and Larcker, 1981).  
--- Insert Table 3 and 4 about here --- 
Finally, to address the common method variance problem, Harman’s single factor test 
was performed (Harman, 1976). The results show that no single factor emerged and no factor 
accounted for more than 50 percent of the variance. These findings suggest that common 
method variance does not appear to be an issue in the current study. 
Overall, the results of fitting the measurement model to the data suggest that the 
constructs used in this study have satisfactory levels of construct validity, internal consistency 
(i.e., reliability), convergent as well as discriminant validity. 
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The second step of Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) approach to structural equation 
modelling requires the development and testing of the structural model in order to test the 
hypotheses. The results of fitting the proposed structural models to the data are shown in 
Figure 2. The structural model shows the path coefficients of the relationships between a 
firm’s proactive posture, its resource integration capability, the disaster-related changes to a 
firm’s resource base and its performance as well as the coefficients of determination (r2 
values). It also shows the relationships of the variables of the study taking into account the 
effects of the control variables on the disaster-related changes to a firm’s resource base.  
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
 
The model shows the positive and significant effect a firm’s proactive posture has on 
its capability to integrate resources from external sources (H2a) which in turn positively and 
significantly affects the extent to which a firm’s resource base was affected by the 
earthquakes (H3). Results also show that a firm’s proactive posture mediates the relationship 
between its capability to acquire and integrate resources from external sources and the extent 
to which a disaster impacts on its resource base (H2b). Firms, whose resource base was 
negatively affected by the earthquakes, reported significant performance decreases (H4). Of 
the control variables, only firm age has a positive and significant effect on how the 
earthquakes impacted on the firm’s resource base (H1d). Older firms were therefore more 
likely to experience negative effects on their resource base. No location effects were found 
confirming H1b. Finally, results show that firm size and industry have no effects on the how 
the earthquakes impacted on the firm’s resource base, rejecting H1a and H1c. 
Proactive posture explains 59 percent of the variance of the firm’s capability to 
integrate resources from external sources. The two dynamic capabilities along with the four 
control variables explain 17 percent of the variation in the firm’s resource base, while the latter 
explains only three percent of the variations in firm performance.  
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A graphic analysis of the significant path coefficients using the ‘warping’ function of 
WarpPLS (Kock, 2011) shows the curvilinear relationships between the variables. As shown 
in Figure 3, the relationship between proactive posture and resource integration can be best 
described as quasi-linear i.e. the stronger a firm’s proactive posture, the better its capability 
to integrate resources from external sources. The relationship between the firm’s capability to 
integrate resources and the extent to which the firm’s resource base was affected by the 
earthquakes is, however, slightly j-shaped. This indicates that initially the effects are rather 
flat, but then drastically increase suggesting cumulative or learning effects supporting a case 
for dynamic capabilities and positive relationship with firm performance. The relationship 
between the extent to which a firm’s resource base was affected by the earthquakes and its 
performance is s-shaped. Firms that experienced positive effects on their resource base 
increased their performance, but firms that experienced negative effects decreased their 
performance. At a certain point, however, this effect reverses suggesting that those firms that 
were the worst affected were able to increase their performance. This suggests that 
depending on the extent of the negative effect the earthquakes had on the resource base of 
firms, the performance changes were different. Finally, the relationship between age and a 
firm’s resource base showed an inverted u-shape indicating the extent to which the firm’s 
resource base is negatively affected by the earthquakes increases as the firm matures, but 
then flattens and curves downward after it reaches a certain point.  
--- Insert Figure 3 about here --- 
5 DISCUSSION  
The current study aimed to gather empirical evidence on the relationship between 
dynamic capabilities, disaster-related changes to a small firm’s resource base and its 
performance in a post-disaster environment.  
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For the purpose of this study, dynamic capabilities have been defined as renewing and 
regenerating dynamic capabilities following Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier’s (2009) model. 
While the firm’s proactive posture represented the learning dimension of regenerative 
dynamic capabilities, resource integration represented the knowledge integration dimension 
of renewing dynamic capabilities (Makkonen et al., 2014). Resource integration has received 
less attention as a dynamic capability compared to for example learning. As small firms have 
limited resources, networks are particularly important for them (Eriksson, 2014). Resource 
integration from external sources is therefore an essential element of a small firm’s strategy 
to survive and recover from a disaster situation in which internal resources might not be 
readily available. Results show that proactive posture helps small firms to manage the 
resource integration and resource integration in turn affects the extent to which a disaster 
impacts on a firm’s resource base. This corresponds with Voudouris et al. (2012) who argue 
that for small firm to be able to effectively integrate networks resources, they need to have 
learned how to manage this integration process.  
Results further support the view that dynamic capabilities enhance the firm’s 
performance via its resource base (Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier, 2009; Teece, 2012) 
rather than directly. This clearly demonstrates that higher level managerial or entrepreneurial 
competences place the firm in a better position to deal with a rapidly changing economic 
environment such as that associated with post-disaster environments. The extent to which 
small firms can respond to new opportunities created by changes to their resource base, 
depends on their dynamic capabilities. Through dynamic capabilities small firms can 
capitalise on their flexibility and offset some of the challenges associated with limited 
resources. Consequently, dynamic capabilities are important for small business resilience 
and recovery in post-disaster environment. 
The research model developed in this study tests regenerative and renewing dynamic 
capabilities. Building on the existing body of literature on dynamic capabilities, the findings 
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have contributed to our understanding of the conceptual distinction between regenerating 
and renewing dynamic capabilities by using a multidimensional construct of dynamic 
capabilities. As a conceptual model that has not yet been applied in a post-disaster 
environment, no relevant empirical measures were available. Consequently, two adapted 
measurement scales have been introduced from the organisational resilience literature (Lee, 
Vargo and Seville, 2013; Stephenson, Vargo and Seville, 2010) to allow measuring dynamic 
capabilities in a novel context. 
Results clearly showed that a disaster can have negative as well as positive effects 
on firms illustrating that post-disaster environments can be interpreted in the light of 
Schumpeter’s creative destruction. Contrary to previous research, however, no industry and 
firm size effects were found on how the Christchurch earthquakes affected customers, supply 
availability, use of premises, staffing availability and staffing levels. This suggests that the 
earthquakes impacted equally on firms from the manufacturing and services sectors. This 
result cannot necessarily be put down solely to the nature of the hazard, as previous studies 
in earthquake-hit regions have consistently pointed towards the service sector being more 
negatively affected (Chang and Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Deitch and Corey, 2011; Dolfman, 
Wasser and Bergman, 2007; Kroll et al., 1990). 
One possible explanation is that the distinction between manufacturing and services 
industry was too broad to pick up more subtle sub-sector dynamics. However, it could also 
be argued that it is the entrepreneur’s perception of the environment together with the extent 
and nature of a firm’s dynamic capabilities that influences how the effects of a disaster are 
experienced. While the impact of a disaster might be the same on manufacturing and 
services, smaller and larger firms, the individual experience and perception of this impact 
might have been different depending on how well-equipped the firm is to change and adapt. 
In other words, while one firm might perceive the glass to be half full, the other one perceives 
it to be half empty. How small firms perceive the impact of a disaster depends to a 
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considerable extent on their ability to change and adapt i.e. their dynamic capabilities. This 
confirms the importance of the manager’s or entrepreneur’s perception of environmental 
volatility (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009; Teece, 2007). Similar firms can therefore deploy 
different dynamic capabilities as a result of differences in their managers’ perception of 
environmental uncertainties (Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003). 
Results further demonstrate the wide-reaching effects of a disaster. In the literature it 
has been argued that it is possible for a business outside the impact zone to be more affected 
than those inside the impact zone if they are involved in a vulnerable sector or vulnerable 
supply chain (Zhang, Lindell and Prater, 2009). Previous research, however, predominantly 
focused on the effects disasters have on businesses inside the impact zone. Results from 
this study suggest that a disaster has wide-ranging knock-on effects on firms outside the 
impact zone. While this finding is not necessarily new, it is the scale of the indirect impact 
that is surprising. Forty-five percent of firms outside the impact zone reported negative effects 
of the earthquakes on customers. Similarly, roughly one third reported negative effects on 
supply availability. This finding illustrates the complex, dynamic and fragile nature of a firm’s 
relationship with its market and environment.  
The age related effect confirms the existence of a liability of aging indicating that older 
firms perceived the impact the disaster had on their resource base to be more negative than 
younger firms (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Barron, 1994; Ranger-Moore, 1997; Thornhill and 
Amit, 2003). While older firms might have developed more valuable resources, they are also 
more likely to have established structures, rules and routines that allow them to generate 
efficiency gains in stable environments. In highly volatile environments, such as post-disaster 
environments, these structures may however lead to inertia and reduce the business ability 
to respond and adapt quickly and flexibly. As a result, older firms experience the impact a 
disaster has on their resource base as more negatively than younger firms. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
Business recovery from a natural disaster is extremely important in relation to providing 
jobs, goods and services as well as tax income (Cochrane, 2004). The ability of a firm to 
mobilise resources is a key factor in its capability to cope with extreme events (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2011). This suggests that the dynamic capabilities view of the firm has the potential 
to greatly enhance our understanding of firm recovery and growth in post-disaster 
environments. Surprisingly though, the dynamic capabilities concept has not yet been applied 
in studies of small firm recovery in post-disaster environments. 
This article has presented empirical research evidence on the role of dynamic 
capabilities in a post-disaster environment, that of Christchurch in New Zealand after the 2010 
and 2011 series of major earthquakes. The earthquakes are still comparatively recent with 
the last major event in December 2011 and the full long term effects will take up to 10 years 
to materialise, assuming no further major events. Based on a research model, it demonstrates 
that a firm’s dynamic capabilities impacts on the extent to which it experiences negative or 
positive effects on its resource base and consequently on its performance. Results highlight 
the importance of a firm’s proactive posture and capability to integrate external resources in 
recognising new opportunities in an environment characterised by high volatility and 
increased uncertainty. 
Several practical recommendations for small firms arise from this study: The most 
important one is to proactively prepare for disaster situations. This includes developing an 
understanding of how the firm is connected with customers, suppliers and other businesses 
in the neighbourhood and what they key resources are that the firm relies upon for survival. 
Further, it is important for small firms to understand how they can mobilise and access the 
resources they need. Active participation in industry or business networks might assist with 
this task. Finally, business owners might benefit from critically assessing their ability to quickly 
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adapt as well as their ability to identify and exploit new opportunities to strengthen their 
adaptive behaviour. 
6.1 Limitations and future research 
However, the authors recognise a number of limitations. First, the current study uses 
proactive posture and resource integration to represent renewing and regenerating dynamic 
capabilities in a post-disaster environment. Results, however, suggest that there might be 
other capabilities and mechanisms that affect the extent to which a firm’s resource base is 
affected by a disaster. Second, the study only measured a firm’s capability to acquire and 
integrate new resources from external sources, but did not take into account the nature or 
type of these resources and external sources. Third, the cross-sectional nature of the current 
study is rather limited in its ability to capture the incremental and long-term impacts of dynamic 
capabilities on a firm’s resource base and performance. Finally, as with much of the post-
disaster research, survivor bias requires careful interpretation of results. The study is based 
on a sample of firms that have been struck by a disaster and have survived long enough to 
be included in the study. As a result, the findings might be overly optimistic in relation to the 
extent to which firms recover from disaster. It has to be stressed that the results represent 
only surviving small firms. Firms that have experienced very strong negative impacts may 
have closed or relocated. This is an inevitable bias with much of the post-disaster research 
and results need to be carefully interpreted in the light of this survivor bias.  
 Nonetheless, these limitations can be addressed in future studies dealing with 
dynamic capabilities of small firms in a post-disaster environment. There is a general scarcity 
of research of this nature particularly on businesses as the unit of study. This article 
contributes to that limited research evidence. There remains, however, a need for further 
research in post-disaster environments including longitudinal research – both qualitative and 
quantitative - that examines the specific adaptive strategies firms have used and how they 
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changed over time. Also, future research would benefit from including small firms that did not 
survive as is likely that the factors that contribute to recovery are different from the factors 
that contribute to closure. Finally, post-disaster research will remain challenging due to the 
specific context that is required. Defining a research agenda that builds on the emerging, but 
fragmented empirical evidence will contribute to a better theoretical understanding of the role 
of small firms in post-disaster environments. 
  
29 
 
REFERENCES 
Aldrich HE and Auster E (1986) Even dwarfs started small: Liabilities of size and age and 
their strategic implications. Research in Organizational Behavior 8: 165–198. 
 
Ambrosini V and Bowman C (2009) What are dynamic capabilities and are they a useful 
construct in strategic management? International Journal of Management Reviews 11(1): 29-
49. 
 
Ambrosini V, Bowman C and Collier N (2009) Dynamic capabilities: an exploration of how 
firms renew their resource base. British Journal of Management 20(1): 9-24. 
 
Anderson AR and Jack SL (2002) The articulation of social capital in entrepreneurial 
networks: a glue or a lubricant? Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 14(3), 193-210. 
 
Anderson J and Gerbing D (1988) Structural equation modelling in practice: A review and 
recommended two-step approach. Psychological Bulletin 103(3): 411-423. 
 
Aragon-Correa JA and Sharma S (2003) A contingent resource-based view of proactive 
corporate environmental strategy. Academy of Management Review 28(1): 71-88. 
 
Armstrong JS and Overton TS (1977) Estimating non-response bias in mail surveys. Journal 
of Marketing Research 14: 396-402. 
 
Bagozzi R, Yi Y and Phillips L (1991) Assessing construct validity in organisational research. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 36(3): 421-458. 
 
30 
 
Barron DN, West E and Hannan MT (1994) A time to grow and a time to die: Growth and 
mortality of credit unions in New York City 1914–1990. American Journal of Sociology 
100: 381–421. 
 
Barney JB (1986) Organizational culture: can it be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage? Academy of Management Review 11(3): 656-665. 
 
Barney JB (1991) Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management 17(1): 99-120. 
 
Bartholomew S and Smith AD (2006) Improving survey response rates from chief executive 
officers in small firms: The Importance of social networks. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice 30(1): 83-96. 
 
Bamiatzi VC and Kirchmaier T (2014) Strategies for superior performance under adverse 
conditions: A focus on small and medium-sized high-growth firms. International Small 
Business Journal 32(3): 259-284. 
 
Bowman C and Ambrosini V (2003) How the resource-based and the dynamic capability 
views of the firm inform corporate-level strategy. British Journal of Management 14: 289–303. 
 
Brown T (2006) Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research, Guildford Press, London.  
 
Cameron A and Massey C (1999) Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: A New Zealand 
Perspective. New Zealand: Pearson Education. 
 
31 
 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (2012) Earthquake recovery update – April 
2012. Christchurch: CERA. 
 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (2013) Canterbury Economic Indicators - August 
2013. Christchurch: CERA. 
 
Chang SE and Falit-Baiamonte A (2002) Disaster vulnerability of businesses in the 
2001Nisqually Earthquake, Environmental Hazards 4: 59-71. 
 
Cochrane H (2004) Economic loss: myth and measurement. Disaster Prevention and 
Management 13(4): 290-296. 
 
Collis DJ (1994) Research note: how valuable are organizational capabilities? Strategic 
Management Journal 15(1): 143-152. 
 
Cowling M, Liu W, Ledger A and Zhang N (2015) What really happens to small and medium-
sized enterprises in a global economic recession? UK evidence on sales and job 
dynamics. International Small Business Journal 33(5): 488-513 
 
Dahles H and Susilowati TP (2015) Business resilience in times of growth and crisis. Annals 
of Tourism Research, 51: 34-50. 
 
Darroch J (2005) Knowledge management, innovation and firm performance. Journal of 
Knowledge Management 9(3): 101-115. 
 
Deitch E and Corey C (2011) Predicting long-term business recovery four years after 
Hurricane Katrina, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 19(3): 169-181. 
32 
 
 
Dillman DA (2007) Mail and Internet surveys: The Tailored Design Method. Hoboken: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
 
Dolfman ML, Wasser SF and Bergman B (2007) The effects of Hurricane Katrina on the New 
Orleans Economy. Monthly Labour Review 130(3): 3-18. 
 
Eisenhardt KM and Martin JA (2000) Dynamic capabilities: what are they? Strategic 
Management Journal 21(10-11): 1105-1121. 
 
Eriksson T (2014) Processes, antecedents and outcomes of dynamic 
capabilities. Scandinavian Journal of Management 30(1): 65-82. 
 
Fornell C and Larcker FD (1981) Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable 
variables and measurement error. Journal of Marketing Research 18(1): 39-50. 
 
Fraccastoro KA (2008) Entrepreneurial recovery from natural disaster: A consideration of 
influential factors. Journal of Business and Economics Research 6(12): 1-8. 
 
Harman HH (1976) Modern factor analysis. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Helfat CE and Martin JA (2015) Dynamic Managerial Capabilities Review and Assessment 
of Managerial Impact on Strategic Change. Journal of Management 41(5): 1281-1312. 
 
Helfat CE and Peteraf MA (2003) The dynamic resource-based view: Capability lifecycles. 
Strategic Management Journal 24(10): 997-1010. 
33 
 
 
Helfat CE and Peteraf MA (2015) Managerial cognitive capabilities and the microfoundations 
of dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management Journal 36(6): 831-850. 
 
Helfat CE, Finkelstein S, Mitchell W, Peteraf M, Singh H, Teece D and Winter SG (2007) 
Dynamic capabilities: Understanding strategic change in organizations. Odford: Blackwell. 
 
Herbane B (2010) Small business research: Time for a crisis-based view. International Small 
Business Journal 28(1): 43-64. 
 
Herbane B (2013) Exploring crisis management in UK small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 21(2): 82-95. 
 
Inland Revenue (2012) Exploring the impact of adverse events on SME tax compliance 
behaviour: A longitudinal study. Wellington: Colmar Brunton. 
 
Kock N (2011) WarpPLS 2.0 User Manual. Laredo, Texas: ScriptWarp Systems. 
 
Koryak O, Mole KF, Lockett A, Hayton JC, Ucbasaran D and Hodgkinson GP (2015) 
Entrepreneurial leadership, capabilities and firm growth. International Small Business 
Journal 33(1): 89-105. 
 
Kroll CA, Landis JD, Shen Q and Stryker S (1990) The economic impacts of the Loma Prieta 
earthquake: A focus on small business, Berkeley Planning Journal 5(1): 39-58. 
 
34 
 
Larson MD and Fowler K (2009) Anticipation is in the eye of the beholder: Top-level managers 
see things differently when it comes to crises preparedness. Journal of Business and 
Management 15(2): 129-142. 
 
Lee AV, Vargo J and Seville E (2013) Developing a tool to measure and compare 
organizations’ resilience. Natural Hazards Review 14(1): 29-41. 
 
Liu Z, Xu J and Han BT (2013) Small-and medium-sized enterprise post-disaster 
reconstruction management patterns and application. Natural Hazards 68(2): 809-835. 
 
McGrath RG (2013) The end of competitive advantage: How to keep your strategy moving 
as fast as your business. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press. 
 
Makkonen H, Pohjola M, Olkkonen R and Koponen A (2014) Dynamic capabilities and firm 
performance in a financial crisis. Journal of Business Research 67(1): 2707-2719. 
 
McKelvie A and Davidson P (2009) From resource base to dynamic capabilities: an 
investigation of new firms. British Journal of Management 20: 63-80. 
 
McManus S, Seville E, Vargo J and Brunsdon D (2008) Facilitated process for improving 
organizational resilience. Natural Hazards Review 9(2): 81-90. 
 
Ministry of Economic Development (2011) SMEs in New Zealand: Structure and Dynamics 
2011. Wellington: Ministry of Economic Development. 
 
Mintzberg H (1978) Patterns in strategy formation. Management Science 24(9): 934-948. 
35 
 
 
Nahapiet J and Ghoshal S (1998) Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational 
advantage. Academy of Management Review 23(2): 242-266. 
 
Neef A, Panyakotkaew A and Elstner P (2015) Post-Tsunami recovery and rehabilitation of 
small enterprises in Phang Nga Province, Southern Thailand. In Shaw R. Recovery from the 
Indian Ocean tsunami: A ten-year journey (pp. 487-503). Springer. 
 
Nelson RR and Winter SG (2002) Evolutionary theorizing in economics, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 16(2): 23-46. 
 
Özsomer A, Calantone RJ and Di Bonetto A (1997) What makes firms more innovative? A 
look at organizational and environmental factors. Journal of Business and Industrial 
Marketing 12(6): 400-416. 
 
Parker M and Steenkamp D (2012) The economic impact of the Canterbury earthquakes. 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin 75(3): 13-25. 
 
Parker CF, Stern EK, Paglia E and Brown C (2009) Preventable catastrophe? The hurricane 
Katrina disaster revisited. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 17(4): 206-220. 
 
Porter ME (1985) Competitive advantage. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Potter SH, Becker JS, Johnston DM and Rossiter KP (2015) An overview of the impacts of 
the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.01.014. 
36 
 
 
Ranger-Moore  J (1997) Bigger may be better, but is older wiser? Organizational age and 
size in the New York life insurance industry. American Sociological Review 62: 903–920. 
 
Schumpeter, J. (1994). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. London: Routledge. 
 
Smallbone D, Deakins D, Battisti M and Kitching J (2012) Small business responses to a 
major economic downturn: Empirical perspectives from New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. International Small Business Journal 30(7): 754-777. 
 
Statistics New Zealand (2013) Christchurch’s population loss slows. Wellington: Statistics 
New Zealand. 
 
Stephenson A, Vargo J and Seville E (2010) Measuring and comparing organisational 
resilience in Auckland. Australian Journal of Emergency Management 25(2): 27. 
 
Stern E (1997) Crisis and learning: A conceptual balance sheet. Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management 5(2): 69-86. 
 
Storey DJ (1994) Understanding the small business sector. London: Thomson. 
 
Sullivan-Taylor B and Branicki L (2011) Creating resilient SMEs: why one size might not fit 
all. International Journal of Production Research 49(18): 5565-5579. 
 
Swiss Re (2012) Swiss Re's sigma on natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2011 
unveils USD 116 billion in insured losses and record economic losses of USD 370 billion. 
37 
 
(http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/nr_20120328_sigma_disasters_2011.html) 
[10 June 2014]. 
 
Teece DJ (2007) Explicating dynamic capabilities: The nature and microfoundations of 
(sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal 28(13): 1319-1350. 
 
Teece DJ (2012) Dynamic capabilities: Routines versus entrepreneurial action. Journal of 
Management Studies 49(8): 1395-1401. 
 
Teece DJ, Pisano G and Shuen A (1997) Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. 
Strategic Management Journal 18(7): 509-533. 
 
Teece DJ and Pisano G (1994) The dynamic capabilities of firms: An introduction. Industrial 
and Corporate Change 3(3): 537-556. 
 
Thornhill S and Amit R (2003) Learning about failure: Bankruptcy, firm age, and the resource-
based view. Organization Science 14(5): 497-509. 
 
Tierney KJ (1997) Business impacts of the Northridge earthquake. Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management 5(2): 87-97. 
 
Tierney KJ (2007) Businesses and disasters: Vulnerability, impacts, and recovery. In 
Handbook of Disaster Research (pp. 275-296). New York: Springer. 
 
Vargo J, and Seville E (2011) Crisis strategic planning for SMEs: Finding the silver lining. 
International Journal of Production Research 49(18): 5619-5635. 
38 
 
 
Voudouris I, Lioukas S, Iatrelli M and Caloghirou Y (2012) Effectiveness of technology 
investment: Impact of internal technological capability, networking and investment's strategic 
importance. Technovation 32(6): 400-414. 
 
Wang C and Han Y (2011) Linking properties of knowledge with innovation performance: The 
moderate role of absorptive capacity. Journal of Knowledge Management 15(5): 802-819. 
 
Webb GR, Tierney KJ and Dahlhamer JM (2000) Businesses and disasters: Empirical 
patterns and unanswered questions. Natural Hazards Review 1(2): 83-90. 
 
Webb GR, Tierney KJ and Dahlhamer JM (2002) Predicting long-term business recovery 
from disaster: a comparison of the Loma Prieta earthquake and Hurricane Andrew. Global 
Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards 4(2): 45-58. 
 
Weick KE and Sutcliffe KM (2011) Managing the unexpected: Resilient performance in an 
age of uncertainty. San Francisco: Wiley and Sons. 
 
Williams N and Vorley T (2014) Economic resilience and entrepreneurship: Lessons from the 
Sheffield City region. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 26(3–4): 257–281. 
 
Winter SG (2003) Understanding dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management Journal 
24(10): 991-995. 
 
Zahra SA, Sapienza H and Davidson P (2006) Entrepreneurship and dynamic capabilities: A 
review, model and research agenda. Journal of Management Studies 43(4): 917-955. 
39 
 
 
Zahra SA and George G (2002) Absorptive capacity: A review, reconceptualization and 
extension. Academy of Management Review 27(2): 185-203 
 
Zhang Y, Lindell MK and Prater CS (2009) Vulnerability of community businesses to 
environmental disasters. Disasters 33(1): 38-57. 
 
Zollo M and Winter SG (2002) Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic capabilities. 
Organization Science 13(3): 339-351. 
 
  
40 
 
Figure 1. Research model 
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Figure 2. Structural model 
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Figure 3. Illustration of relationship between variables 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the sample firms 
Firm size f % 
5 employees and less 235 43 
6 to 49 employees 279 51 
50 to 99 employees 31 6 
Total 545 100 
Firm age f % 
10 years and younger 61 11 
11 to 20 years 137 25 
21 years and older 347 64 
Total 545 100 
Sector f % 
Manufacturing 288 53 
Service 257 47 
Total 545 100 
Location f % 
Inside impact zone 98 18 
Outside impact zone 447 82 
Total 545 100 
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Table 2. Measurement model 
Constructs and indicators Standardised factor loadings   
Proactive posture (ave = .67) α  = .88 CRC=.91  
We are able to shift rapidly from business-as-usual mode to 
respond to a disaster. .79 
We are focused on being able to respond to the unexpected. .89 
Whenever we suffer a close call, we use it as a trigger for self-
evaluation rather than confirmation of success .78 
We have clearly defined priorities for what is important during and 
after a disaster. .83 
We clearly understand the minimum level of resources it needs to 
operate successfully. .83 
 
Resource integration (ave = .68) α  = .88 CRC=.91  
We actively participate in industry and sector groups. .81 
We collaborate with others in our industry to manage unexpected 
challenges. .85 
We have agreements with other organisations to provide 
resources in a disaster. .82 
We keep in contact with organisations that we might have to work 
with in a disaster. .82 
We understand how we are connected to other businesses in the 
same industry and location, and actively manage those links. .83 
 
Disaster-related changes to firm’s resource base (ave = .63) α  = .84 CRC=.89  
Customers .54 
Staffing availability .88 
Staffing level .91 
Premises .86 
Supply availability .78 
Firm performance (ave = .66) α  = .74 CRC=.85  
Turnover  .87 
Profitability .86 
Productivity  .70 
  
Legend: 
AVE – average variance extracted 
α – Cronbach’s alpha 
CRC – composite reliability coefficient 
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Table 3. Means, standard deviation and correlations of variables 
Constructs and 
variables 
Mean SD POST INTEG BASE PERF SIZE SEC AGE LOC 
Proactive posture 
(POST) 
2.55 .70 .82        
Resource integration  
(INTEG) 
2.91 .68 .74** .83.       
Disaster-related 
changes to firm’s 
resource base 
(BASE) 
 
3.2 
 
.47 
.33** .34** .79      
Performance 
(PERF) 
2.8 .78 .18** .11* .12* .81     
Size (SIZE in 
number of staff) 
13.93 24.65 -.07 -.08 -.02 -.16 n/a    
Sector (SEC) - - .04 .02 -.01 -.08 .05 n/a   
Age (AGE in years) 28.52 19.91 .03 .01 .04 .02 .01 .02 n/a  
Location (LOC) - - .06 .01 -.01 -.04 .06 -.06 .02 n/a 
*p<.05; **p<.01           
n/a – not applicable/not a construct 
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Table 4: Direct, indirect and total effects 
 Direct effects Indirect effects Total effects 
Proactive posture -> Resource integration .76**  .76** 
Proactive posture -> Resource base .29** .10** .39** 
Proactive posture -> Performance  .02 .02 
Resource integration -> Resource base .12*  .12* 
Resource integration -> Performance  .02 .02 
Resource base -> Performance .18**  .18** 
Size -> Resource base -.05  -.05 
Sector -> Resource base .00  .00 
Age -> Resource base .08*  .08* 
Location -> Resource base .02  .02 
Size -> Performance  -.01 -.01 
Sector -> Performance  .00 .00 
Age -> Performance  .01 .01 
Location -> Performance  .00 .00 
 
 
